The conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is wrong. Using the methodology of Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009), we estimate income distributions, poverty rates, and inequality and welfare indices for African countries for the period 1970-2006. We show that: (1) African poverty is falling and is falling rapidly. (2) If present trends continue, the poverty Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people with incomes less than one dollar a day will be achieved on time.
Introduction
After three decades of zero or negative growth, Africa began a growth spurt around 1995 that has been sustained at least to 2006. Some analysts claim that this growth trend has not been strong enough to reduce poverty. For (World Bank (2004) .) The U.N. Millenium Campaign Deputy Director for Africa says: "Poverty continues to intensify due to the exclusion of groups of people on the basis of class, caste, gender, disability, age, race, religion and other status," (UN Millenium Campaign (2009) .) This conventional wisdom is further documented and critically reviewed in Easterly (2009) 
It is also believed that most of the recent African growth is due to rising oil and natural resource prices, which entails a redistribution of income from mineral-poor countries to mineral-rich countries (Collier (2006) .) Moreover, gains from natural resource wealth are believed to accrue to very narrow elites and to be irrelevant for poverty reduction. These claims imply that African growth should be accompanied by rapidly rising inequality, which is testable with data.
In this paper, we use the methodology of Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009) to estimate income distributions for African countries, and compute their poverty rates, and inequality and welfare indices for the period . Our results show that the conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is wrong. In fact, since 1995, African poverty has been falling steadily. Moreover, contrary to the commonly held idea that African growth is largely based on natural resources and helps only the rich and well-connected, we show that Africa's income distribution has become less rather than more unequal than it was in 1995, and therefore, that a great deal of this growth has accrued to the poor. Specifically, Africa's growth trend in 1995 has been accompanied by a symmetric, sustained reduction in poverty that places it on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty within a few years of 2015. If countries hit by exceptional adverse shocks like Congo-Zaire 2 converge to the average African poverty rate, then the first poverty MDG will actually be achieved two years in advance of 2015.
Not only has poverty fallen in Africa as a whole, but this decline has been remarkably general across types of countries that the literature suggests should have different growth performances. In particular, poverty fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for mineral-rich as well as mineral-poor countries; for countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture; for countries regardless of colonial origin; and for countries with below-or abovemedian slave exports per capita during the African slave trade. 3 Hence, the substantial decline in poverty is not driven by any particular country or set of countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the data and the statistical procedure to estimate the income distributions of African countries and of all of Africa in every year in the sample period. Section 3 describes the evolution of the income distributions. Section 4 analyzes the evolution of poverty rates in Africa. Section 5 provides measures of inequality and welfare. Section 6 discusses the evolution of poverty for various African regions. Section 7 provides robustness checks, and section 8 concludes.
Data and statistical procedure
We use national accounts purchasing-power-parity (PPP)-adjusted GDP data from Penn
World Tables, Mark 6.2. We use this series because it is the standard GDP series used in the study of economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) . In the robustness checks, we 2 The Democratic Republic of Congo was called Zaire for most of our sample period (until 1997).
We will refer to the country as Congo-Zaire in this paper.
3 Bloom and Sachs (1998) suggest that landlocked countries, or countries with unfavorable agriculture have poorer performance than geographically advantaged countries. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the identity of the colonizer may matter for subsequent economic development. Nunn (2008) presents evidence that the impact of the African slave trade was highly persistent, and affected recent African performance.
experiment with other national accounts-based series with comprehensive coverage of all countries and years we consider, but with different corrections for PPP.
We obtain inequality data from the WIDER-DS dataset, pioneered by Deininger and Squire (1996) and maintained by the United Nations University. The dataset provides Gini coefficients and quintile shares for countries and years in which income or consumption surveys were conducted. In order to maintain comparability of the survey data, we select surveys from WIDER-DS following special criteria and we adjust surveys with consumption data so that they are comparable to surveys with income data, which is described in detail by Pinkovskiy and Salai-Martin (2009) . Overall, we have 118 surveys for the 48 African countries considered.
Our procedure exactly follows Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009) . The crux of the methodology is to assume that the distribution of income in each country and each year has the same functional form, with changes in GDP and inequality manifesting themselves through changes in the parameters of this form only. Then, we use the survey data to recover the functional form parameters, and from these parameters we can compute any statistic of the distribution of income for any country or for all of Africa that we want. Following Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009), our baseline functional form is lognormal but, as a robustness check, we also consider Gamma, and Weibull distributions. These distributions are mathematically convenient because they have a single parameter that determines the mean of the distribution (the scale parameter), and a single parameter that determines the degree of inequality of the distribution (the distribution parameter). In particular, the Gini coefficient and the quintile shares of each distribution are functions of the distribution parameter alone. Hence, it is very easy to compute the distribution parameter on the basis of the survey data alone, and then to compute the scale parameter on the basis of the distribution parameter and GDP, so that the mean of the distribution of each country is given exactly by GDP. We proceed as follows:
I) For country-years with surveys, our baseline method for obtaining the distributional parameter is to choose the distributional parameter that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between the quintile shares in the data and the theoretical predicted quintile shares based on the distributional parameter. In our robustness section we experiment with two methods. The first is to invert the theoretical expression for the Gini coefficient. The second method is similar to the baseline method, except we replace the 5 quintile shares by the three middle quintile shares divided by the total share of the middle 60%, and minimize the squared deviations of these three numbers from their theoretically predicted values. We ignore the top and bottom quintile shares because there may be considerable doubt as to the accuracy of the surveys in reporting the incomes of the very rich (who may be unwilling to participate, or who may lie outright to conceal their income) and the very poor (whose income may be in kind, and hence, converted into a monetary equivalent with error). Using only the three middle shares avoids these problems so long as all survey respondents are correctly placed into the quintile of the sample that they belong to, which is much more likely than that their income is reported correctly.
II) For countries and years without survey data, we impute a Gini coefficient, which we then invert to get the distributional parameter. If the country in question has two or more surveys in other years, we impute the Ginis for a year without data by interpolating and extrapolating the series of Gini coefficients we have from WIDER-DS. In the robustness section, we experiment with different interpolation and extrapolation procedures in the robustness checks. We then compute the average of the Gini series for all countries with two or more surveys (weighting such countries equally). For countries with no surveys, we impute this average Gini series. For countries with exactly one survey, we impute the average Gini series but shift it vertically to coincide with the single observation of the Gini for that country in the year in which this observation is made.
III) For each country in each year, we compute the scale parameter from GDP and the distributional parameter.
IV) Using the assumed functional forms and the calculated parameters, we compute poverty and inequality statistics for each country, for all of Africa, and for any groups of countries of special interest.
In our robustness checks, we experiment with varying the GDP source, the assumed functional form, the method of interpolation and extrapolation, and the method of recovering the distributional parameter. We list these variations below: horizontal interpolation and horizontal extrapolation, although if the last two surveys happened in consecutive years, linear extrapolation is used. Linear extrapolation allows for greater variation of inequality in the period after our data ends, and allows strong responses of inequality to trends at the point at which our data ends.
d) We consider three methods of recovering distribution parameters from data: i) minimize least squares of quintiles, ii) minimize least squares of ratios of each of the middle three quintiles to their sum, iii) invert the Gini.
For our baseline estimates, we make the following choices:
• GDP data from PWT 6.2
• Cubic splines to interpolate between available survey data, and extrapolate by horizontal projection.
• Lognormal distributions in all countries, and recover scale parameters from least squares minimization on quintiles.
These choices are most consistent with the previous literature on measuring world income distribution and with the growth literature in general. 
Dynamics of the African Distribution of Income

Poverty
To better assess the evolution of poverty, Figure 5 and Table I The main point is that Africa has been moving in the right direction and, while progress has not been as substantial and spectacular as in Asia, poverty has been falling and it has been falling substantially. We should not let the literal interpretation of the MDGs turn good news (Africa is rapidly moving in the right direction) into bad news (Africa will not achieve the MDGs on time).
5
Column 2 of Table I 
Inequality and Welfare
This section analyzes the evolution of inequality and welfare. Many analysts claim that, because Africa's economy is largely based on natural resources, the growth rate of the last decade has benefited mainly the political and economic elites that own those resources. If this were true, we should observe an explosion in all measures of income inequality. And, of course, this can be checked with our data. Figure 12 displays the overall Gini coefficient for Africa:
starting at a level of around 0.63, the inequality index increased to around 0.66 during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Then it stayed at that level until the early 1990s and started a downward trend that took it to its initial level by 2006. In other words, during the period of positive and sustained African growth (1995 to 2006), not only inequality did not explode as predicted by those who say that all the wealth went to a narrow elite, but it actually declined substantially.
As is well known (e.g. Cowell (2000) ), the Gini coefficient is not decomposable in the sense that the sum of "within-country inequality" and "between-country inequality" do not add 
Regional Analysis
It is interesting to see whether African poverty reduction has been not only fast, but also general across characteristics of countries that the literature has identified as important for development. Bloom and Sachs (1998) Others have suggested that troubled history may have a persistent effect on growth performance. Nunn (2008) , for example, argues that the African slave trade had "particularly detrimental consequences, including social and ethnic fragmentation, political instability and a weakening of states, and the corruption of judicial institutions," which led the parts of Africa most affected by the slave trade to grow much slower than the parts that were not. La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that the identity of the colonizer mattered substantially for development.
Since these factors are permanent (and cannot be changed with good policy), they imply that some parts of Africa may be at a persistent growth disadvantage relative to others.
In this section, we show the differential growth and poverty reduction performance of these types of African countries. Figure 16 breaks down Africa into landlocked and coastal countries.
The list of countries in each category is provided in Appendix Table I . Panel A shows that between 1970 and 2006, both GDP per capita and the growth rate were larger for coastal than for landlocked countries. Panel B displays the evolution of the poverty rate for the two regions.
As expected, the poverty rate for coastal countries is smaller. The interesting phenomenon, however, is that poverty in landlocked countries has also fallen. In fact, it has fallen faster than in coastal regions, especially over the last decade. Poverty in the mid-1990s was close to 55% for the landlocked and about 35% the coastal countries. By 2006 the poverty rates in the two regions was 35% and 30% respectively. Hence, it does not appear that being landlocked is an insurmountable impediment to reducing poverty in Africa. Table I . Panel A shows that mineral-rich countries have higher levels of GDP per capita and that their growth rate experienced an inflection at some point during the mid-nineties. GDP per capita for mineral-poor countries has been growing steadily throughout the sample period.
Panel B shows that, while poverty rates in mineral-rich countries started out being much lower than in mineral-poor countries in the 1970s; by the mid-1980s the poverty rates in the two regions were about the same. Since then, the rates in mineral-rich and mineral-poor countries have fallen very similarly. By 2006, the poverty rate in mineral-poor was actually lower than in mineral-rich countries. Hence, the notion that African progress in poverty reduction is a statistical artifact due entirely or even mainly the favorable terms of trade shocks of the mineral-rich countries does not appear to be consistent with the data.
6 For the mineral-rich/mineral-poor breakdown, as well as for the favorable/unfavorable agriculture breakdown, omitting the countries not classified by Nijkam (2008) from the analysis does not qualitatively change the results was lower in the unfavorable than in the favorable countries, even though it was more than 10 basis points higher only ten years earlier. We now compare the performance of countries at war with countries at peace. Since many African countries have been at war at some point during the sample period, we use 1997
(the last year of the availability of Correlates of War data) as a breaking point. A country is labeled to be at war if it was at war in 1997 and it is labeled to be at peace if it is at peace in 1997 according to the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees 2000) . Appendix Table I Nunn (2008) argues that a substantial part of Africa's underdevelopment can be explained by the African slave trades. In essence, countries that did not suffer from the slave trades should tend to perform better than countries that did because the slave trades had damaging and permanent effects such as social and ethnic fragmentation, political instability and a weakening of states, and the corruption of judicial institutions. To assess this point Figure   21 decomposes Africa into countries that had slave exports per capita above (high-slave countries) and below (low-slave countries) the African median respectively. The definitions are taken from Nunn (2008) and the list of countries in each category is reported in Appendix Table   I . Panel A shows that low-slave countries are richer in the sense of having larger GDP per capita than high-slave countries. Panel B shows that the evolution of poverty has been more favorable for high-slave countries. Starting from a level of over 50% in the mid 1980s, the poverty rate in high-slave countries declined dramatically over the following two and a half decades. The poverty rate was 35% in 2006. The poverty rate of low-slave countries, on the other hand, started at around 25% in the 1970s and it increased to over 30% by 1993. Poverty for low-slave countries levels off and slightly declines after 1995. It is surprising that poverty declines so little for the low-slave countries, but this can largely be explained because most of the growth that low-slave countries experienced since took place in countries that already had relatively low poverty in 1995, whereas the low-slave countries with substantial poverty grew relatively little in the aggregate since 1995. Finally, we compare the experience of African countries by colonial origin. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that colonized countries inherited the legal framework of their colonizers and that some legal frameworks are more favorable to development than others. Panel A of Figure   22 displays the evolution of GDP. Former British colonies are richer than former French colonies.
Portuguese colonies started out being the richest in 1970 but their GDP per capita declined rapidly in the 1970s due to the civil wars in Angola (1975 Angola ( -2002 and Mozambique (1977 Mozambique ( -1992 . Colonial Origins: Poverty
Our conclusion is that African poverty reduction has not only been large, but it also has been general, affecting many different types of countries. It is important to understand what our regional results do and do not imply. There is nothing in these results that should be interpreted as causal: the variation we are using is not exogenous. In particular, we cannot conclude that there is an "advantage to backwardness" because countries with disadvantaged history or geography reduce poverty faster (for instance, we may observe this because these countries are poorer in the first place, and have more poverty to reduce). However, we can conclude that neither geography nor history is destiny: it is possible for countries with poor geography and troubled history not only to reduce poverty rapidly, but to converge to the more advantaged countries, at least for the range of the data that we observe.
Robustness
In order to be confident in our results, we analyze changing the baseline specification in several directions. Figure 23 presents the $1/day poverty rate for Africa under all the variations pertaining to extrapolation and functional form described in Section 2, as well as for World Bank and Maddison GDP. It is clear that the differences in estimates are very small, so that not only does poverty decline for each specification, but estimates from each specification follow the same qualitative pattern. Moreover, poverty declines across all specifications, so that the highest value for poverty across specifications in 2006 is less than the lowest value for poverty in 1970 (the starting year) or in 1995 (the year in which the declining trend begins). The only series that do not substantively match the baseline series are those for which the inequality parameters were produced by inverting the Gini, or by using the middle three quintiles only, as well as the series based on World Bank GDP after the PPP revision, which are shown in Figure   24 . However, these three series also follow the same qualitative pattern as the baseline.
Interestingly, the series based on the middle three quintiles, which should not depend on mismeasurements of income at the top or at the bottom of the distribution, shows a lower level of poverty for the entire sample period, which suggests that if the functional form assumption is correct, then mismeasurement of income takes place primarily for the poor, probably through undervaluing in-kind income. We also use these variations, alongside with the standard variations of excluding one large country, to perform a robustness check on our predictions for when the Millennium Development Goals will be achieved. Table II (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) suggests that the Millennium Development Goals will be met in a reasonable amount of time. Table III shows the results of the extrapolations if Congo-Zaire is excluded from extrapolation, which assumes that as Congo-Zaire recovers from its war, it will reduce poverty sufficiently quickly to converge to the African mean poverty level. Then, the MDGs are met by 2015, except for the variations involving changing the source of GDP, and even then, the Millennium Development Goals are met by 2022. In results not reported, we check that the regional results described in Section 6 are valid qualitatively with the omission of any large country.
A final, but important, concern is that our results are being driven by survey selection.
First, the number of surveys declines for the last years of the sample. If our extrapolation procedure understates inequality in Africa for these years, then poverty reduction will appear greater than it really is. This concern is partially addressed by our variations for extrapolation;
neither the series with linear extrapolation nor the one with horizontal extrapolation vary much from the baseline series. Since the linear extrapolation series is sensitive to trends in inequality at the end of the sample period, this means that there were no incipient trends for inequality to rise in large African countries, which might have produced rising inequality in Africa overall that might have prevented growth from translating into poverty reduction. A further concern is that the surveys at the beginning of the period tend to be income surveys, whereas the surveys at the end of the period overwhelmingly are consumption surveys, and income is more unequally distributed than consumption is. Hence, the fall in inequality that we observe during the 1990s and the 2000s might simply be a result of inadequately correcting for the fact that consumption inequality is lower than income inequality.
To investigate theses concerns explicitly, we plot the poverty and inequality series 
Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that Africa is reducing poverty, and doing it much faster than we thought. The growth from the period 1995-2006, far from benefiting only the elites, has been sufficiently widely spread that both total African inequality and African within-country inequality actually declined over this period. In particular, the speed at which Africa has reduced poverty since 1995 puts it on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty relative to 1990 by 2015 on time or, at worst, a couple of years late. If Congo-Zaire converges to Africa once it is stabilized, the MDG will be achieved by 2012, three years before the target date.
These results are qualitatively robust to changes in our methodology, including using different data sources and assumptions for what happens to inequality when inequality data is not available.
We also find that the African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be explained by a large country, or even by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial geographical or historical characteristic. All classes of countries, including those with disadvantageous geography and history, experience reductions in poverty. In particular, poverty fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for mineral-rich as well as mineral-poor countries; for countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture; for countries regardless of colonial origin; and for countries with below-or above-median slave exports per capita during the African slave trade. This observation is particularly important because it shows that poor geography and history have not posed insurmountable obstacles to poverty reduction. The lesson we draw is largely optimistic: even the most benighted parts of the poorest continent can set themselves firmly on the trend of limiting and even eradicating poverty within the space of a decade. Table I Total  48  19  23  17  18  5  3  24  8 Note: "1" indicates country belongs to category, "0" that it does not belong, red numbers indicate imputation on basis of CIA World Factbook. Sources: for geographical variables, Nijkam (2008) 
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